Speaker: James Grayot (Universidade do Porto)
James Grayot is a postdoctoral research fellow in the Mind, Language & Action Group at the Instituto de Filosofia, Universidade do Porto. He received his Ph.D. from the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research bridges philosophy of economics, behavioural science, and cognitive science, addressing how decision models in behavioural economics and neuroscience contribute to our epistemic understanding of rational agency. He also examines the explanatory potential of embodied and extended cognition for complex cognitive processes such as strategic reasoning and decision-making, working to integrate non-representational approaches with traditional computational models of the mind.
James has held prestigious visiting fellowships at Tilburg University’s Centre for Moral Psychology, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS), and at the Centre for Research in Experimental and Applied Epistemology (CRESA) at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University. He has taught at leading universities across Europe and the U.S., including Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Leiden University, University of Groningen, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rutgers State University, and San Jose State University.
Title
How does the embodied and extended mind internalize content?
Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of how embodied and extended minds internalize external representations and the implications for human cognition. Standard accounts, such as the thesis of neural reuse, hold that cortical networks are repurposed to manage novel representational content. While this view has garnered wide support, it inherits difficulties from traditional representational theories of cognition and leaves unresolved the question of whether neural systems represent at all. Moderate theories of extended and embodied cognition, such as Clark’s extended functionalism and Menary’s cognitive integration, better capture the transformative role of external symbols and practices but each raise ontological challenges concerning the relation between internal and external representational processes. To move forward, I evaluate two alternatives: (1) framing internalization in terms of symbolic affordances, which deny the need for internal representations but risk neglecting key (internal) features of cognitive transformation, and (2) construing internalization through inner speech, which supports cognitive transformation but risks separating representational content from the vehicles upon which complex cognitive achievements depend. I argue for a synthesis of these approaches, offering a dynamic, process-based conception of representation that transcends traditional representationalist models, but differs from radical, anti-representationalist accounts by allowing for the possibility of truly internalized content.
Everyone interested is welcome to attend.
The meeting will be held in English.
Participation is strongly recommended for students of the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences and for students of the Doctoral School “The Human Mind and its Explanations: Language, Brain, and Reasoning”.
Where: Online
When: 19/11/2025 – 17:00 CET
Attendance: Attendance is free and open to all, but registration is needed by email [angelica.kaufmann@unimi.it]